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significant or desirable effects 
on other measures of regional 
well-being.
• Above-average STEM KSAs
are associated with increased
regional well-being, but
“high” may not be as high as is
typically assumed. Not all value
comes from college-degreed
STEM occupations. These
results show the importance
of many technician and
mechanical jobs that often
are overlooked or ignored in
articles, research, and policy
on the economic importance of
STEM jobs.
• Efforts to help dislocated
workers may be more effective
if they explore the skills
associated with previous
occupations and try to match
workers to occupations with
similar skill needs. Helping
workers make the case
for cross-cutting skills to
regional employers could be
a more effective economic
development strategy than
investment in big leaps of
unrelated retraining.
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Race to the Bottom? 
Local Tax Break Competition and Business Location
Evan Mast
STEM and the Local Economy
ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS 
n Competition from nearby local governments increases business tax breaks.
n Simulations suggest that businesses typically locate in the same towns that they
would have chosen if local tax breaks were not allowed.
State and local governments in the 
United States spend $45–$80 billion 
each year on programs that encourage 
economic development in a particular 
geographic area (Bartik 2017; Kline 
and Moretti 2014). These programs, 
often called place-based policies, 
typically offer tax breaks in an effort 
to attract businesses or encourage 
the growth of existing businesses. 
These range from huge subsidies like 
the $3 billion that Foxconn recently 
received from the state of Wisconsin 
to small programs that target local 
small businesses. A crucial feature of 
place-based policies is that they are 
very decentralized—state and local 
governments account for 80 percent of 
total spending. 
This article highlights findings from 
a recent paper that focuses on two 
potential effects of decentralization 
in business tax breaks (Mast 2017). 
First, competition between subnational 
governments could increase total tax 
exemptions. Second, local control of 
tax breaks could cause firms to choose 
locations where they produce more 
value for the community. The latter 
may occur because jurisdictions with 
more to gain from landing a firm offer 
larger exemptions, sending a signal 
that could improve the match quality 
between towns and firms.
These two effects are important for 
evaluating policies that restrict which 
governments can offer tax breaks, such 
as proposals to ban state exemptions 
or the recent moratorium on some 
local exemptions in the Phoenix area. 
Such proposals have attracted attention 
recently, as Amazon and Foxconn have 
conducted well-publicized searches for 
locations for new expansions. 
The Importance of Local Taxes 
For Businesses
This article focuses on local, rather 
than state, government tax breaks. State 
and local taxes are a large component 
of the total business tax burden—a 
2014 estimate pegged total state and 
local businesses taxes at $688 billion 
versus total federal corporate income 
tax revenues of $320 billion (Phillips et 
al. 2015).1
While state incentive packages for 
national searches are more heavily 
publicized, local tax breaks are 
important in many cases. First, most 
firms do not search nationally when 
considering an expansion or relocation. 
Second, even for firms conducting 
national searches, there is often a 
second, local stage to their search. 
For example, Foxconn considered 
several sites in Racine and Kenosha 
Counties after announcing their 
intention to build in Wisconsin. Local 
tax breaks also amount to large sums—
approximately $700 million in New 
York State in 2013.
The Effect of Competition on Local 
Tax Breaks
To begin, I study spatial competition 
between local governments in New 
York State. Do governments offer 
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more tax breaks when there are more 
competitors nearby? In New York, 
competitors are industrial development 
agencies (IDAs), local economic 
development agencies that represent 
either a county or a town and offer tax 
breaks in an effort to improve economic 
conditions in their jurisdictions. While 
every county has an IDA, only about 50 
of 1,000 towns have their own agencies. 
A town that does not have its own IDA 
is represented by its county’s IDA.
The correlation between the 
number of IDAs within 25 kilometers 
and the dollars of tax breaks in a 
town, shown in Figure 1, suggests 
that competition increases tax breaks. 
However, this association may reflect 
other characteristics that are correlated 
with high levels of competition—for 
example, heavily populated areas have 
both more competition and more 
economic activity. To circumvent this 
problem, I use geography to construct 
a natural experiment.
Figure 2 shows the towns in 
Ulster County labeled according to 
the number of counties within 25 
kilometers of the town. Within the 
county, variation in this measure 
appears to be idiosyncratic—it depends 
mostly on whether a town is at the edge 
or on the corner of its county. Noting 
this, I compare towns within the same 
county that have different numbers 
of counties within 25 kilometers in 
order to estimate the causal effect of 
increased competition. 
I find that an additional IDA within 
25 kilometers increases the probability 
that at least one business in a town 
receives tax exemptions from 25 to 
30 percent and increases the dollars 
of exemptions by over 50 percent. 
These estimates show that tax break 
competition is not entirely driven by 
competing states and suggest that tax 
breaks are not exclusively a tool to help 
firms on the margin of profitability. 
I also show that the effect rapidly 
fades out as the radius of competition 
extends beyond 25 kilometers, 
suggesting that competition is quite 
local.
The Effect of Tax Breaks on 
Business Location
The previous exercise sheds light 
on the effect of competition but says 
little about how tax breaks affect firm 
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location. To address this question—in 
particular, how business locations 
would change if towns were not 
allowed to offer tax breaks—I perform 
a simulation exercise.
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Figure 1  Tax Breaks in Towns with Different Levels of Local Competition
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SOURCE: Author’s calculations using New York State data.
Figure 2  Example Variation in the Number of Counties within 25 km of a Town
City IDA
County
I develop a simple model of towns 
offering tax breaks to attract firms. 
Towns compete in a setting similar to 
an auction, but with the twist that firms 
also have preferences over towns, so 
they do not just select the town that 
offers the largest tax break. I choose the 
parameters of the model to match the 
effect of competition estimated in the 
previous section. 
I use the estimated model to 
simulate two counterfactual policies—
eliminating town IDAs (leaving 
just county IDAs) and eliminating 
all IDAs. I find that firms typically 
choose the same location across the 
two counterfactuals and a status quo 
simulation, indicating that tax breaks 
do little to improve the town/firm 
match. The town most likely to land 
a particular firm is the same in every 
policy regime for about 85 percent of 
firms. 
This result occurs not because 
firms do not care about tax breaks, 
but because of the way that IDAs 
interact with one another. For 
example, suppose that Syracuse is 
attractive to Firm A and has a very 
high probability of winning when no 
tax breaks are allowed. When local tax 
breaks are allowed, competing towns 
will offer tax breaks in an attempt to 
cut into Syracuse’s lead, but Syracuse 
will respond with an exemption 
large enough to stay ahead of the 
competition. This strategic behavior 
reduces changes in firm location across 
policy regimes. 
Caveats
There are several important caveats 
to these results, particularly for 
those on firm location. As with any 
simulation exercise, it is necessary to 
make several simplifying assumptions. 
The most important is that firms are 
only choosing among towns in New 
York State. This implies that my model 
is best suited to firms conducting 
a local search—such as retail and 
services establishments, distribution 
centers, or small manufacturing 
ventures—or firms in the second stage 
of a national search. Businesses in 
my sample tend to be relatively small 
and in retail or services, and I also 
present survey evidence in the paper 
suggesting that many firms search 
within a local area. 
NOTE 
1. Office of Management and Budget, 
Historical Tables: https://www.whitehouse 
.gov/omb/historical-tables/ (accessed 
January 3, 2018).
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Three New Databases from the Upjohn Institute
• Panel Database on Incentives and Taxes: Contains data on incentives and taxes for 33 states and 45 industries for the 
past 26 years. It offers the most comprehensive information available to date on incentives to business for economic 
development provided by state and local governments in the United States. Available for free at http://www.upjohn.org/
models/bied/home.php.
• New Hires Quality Index: Matches newly hired workers to their wages by occupation, which is more closely tied to skill 
demand than measures based on industry. The index accounts for changing demographics of hires, can be consistently 
constructed from 2001 forward overall and for subgroups, does not rely on self-reported wages, and will be updated 
monthly. Available for free at http://www.upjohn.org/nhqi/.
• Promise Database: Interactive database of place-based scholarship (aka “Promise”) programs. Use this database to 
generate profiles of individual programs or to sort programs by a variety of characteristics, including location, year 
established, source of scholarship funding, type of community served, and other key characteristics. Available for free  
at http://www.upjohn.org/promise/database/.
An additional IDA within 25 km 
increases the probability that at 
least one business in a town receives 
tax exemptions from 25 to 30 
percent and increases the dollars of 
exemptions by over 50 percent. 
